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Nahdatul Ulama

By:
Mitsuo Nakamura, Shalahudin Kafrawi
Source:
The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World What is This? Provides comprehensive scholarly coverage of the full geographical and historical extent of Islam

Nahdatul Ulama

Established on January 31, 1926 (AH Rajab 16, 1344), the Nahdatul Ulama (or Nahdlatul Ulama, abbreviated NU; from Ar., nahḍat al-ʿulamāʿ) is one of the two largest Muslim social organizations in contemporary Indonesia. It embodies the solidarity of traditionalist ʿulamāʿ and their followers who hold to the Sunnī schools of Ashʿarī and Māturīdī (a variant of Ashʿarī) theology and who hold to one of the four Sunnī schools of Islamic law, among which the Shāfiʿī school has been dominant.

The social basis of NU has been and still is largely the pesantren or traditional institution of Islamic learning, where santri (religious students) live and learn classic Arabic texts (kitab kuning) under the tutelage of a kyai (the head of a pesantren and Islamic spiritual leader). There are reportedly about six thousand pesantren, with more than one million santri, mostly in rural areas throughout the country. Most pesantren are affiliated with NU, and almost all of them follow orthodox Sunnism. The best-known NU pesantren are largely concentrated in eastern and central Java. The NU's presence over the past three generations, with members and supporters currently estimated at forty million, is a testimonial to the resilience, adaptability, and vitality of Islamic traditionalism in Indonesia.

Origins and Purpose.

The name of the organization—“awakening of ʿulamāʿ ”—reflects two aspects of its origin. It was part of the wave of nationalist awakening spearheaded by Sarekat Islam (SI), which was formed in 1912. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah (1888–1971), a later co-founder of NU, is said to have formed a branch of the SI in Mecca in 1913. Upon returning to Indonesia, he established an educational organization named Nahdlatul Wathan (from Ar., nahḍat al-waṭan, “awakening of the nation”) in Surabaya in 1916, and this became a forerunner of the NU.

At the same time, the challenge of reformism represented by Muḥammad ʿAbduh of Egypt was influencing Indonesian ʿulamāʿ in the form of the Muḥammadīyah, the second major Muslim organization in twentieth-century Indonesia. The abolition of the caliphate in Turkey and the fall of the Hejaz to the Wahhābī Ibn Saʿūd in 1924 caused open conflicts in the Indonesian Muslim community. These changes profoundly disturbed the mainstream Javanese ʿulamāʿ to which Hasbullah belonged. The reformists’ maxim of the return to the Qurʿān and prophetic tradition, which tends to be literal and suggests monolithic interpretations of the texts, takes away the rich intellectual heritage of Islam and the flexibility of the application of Islamic ideals in varying contexts (ʿillat, Ar. ʿillah). Muslims who had been influenced by the reformist ideas accused their fellow Muslims, who integrated local customs into Islamic teachings, of practicing bidʿah (heretical religious innovation). For Hasbullah and like-minded ʿulamāʿ, recognizing and taking measures against such threats was an urgent need. Hasyim Asyʿari (1871–1947), kyai of the pesantren of Tebuireng, Jombang, East Java, who was then the most revered of Javanese ʿulamāʿ, approved their request to form the NU in 1926 and became its first president.

The NU's original charter of 1926 stated its purposes as follows: to enhance the relationships among ʿulamāʿ of the various Sunnī schools; to examine textbooks to determine whether they are appropriate for ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamāʿah (people who follow the customs of the Prophet and the Muslim community) or constitute bidʿah; to propagate Islam based on the teachings of the four schools; to establish madrasahs; to manage mosques, prayer houses, and dormitories (pondok); to look after orphans and the poor; and to organize bodies for the advancement of agriculture, trade, and industry that are lawful in Islamic terms.

The principles that NU adopted suit Indonesian plural society well. The principles of moderation (tawassuṭ), tolerance (tasāmuḥ), balance (tawāzun), and commanding good and forbidding evil (amr bi al-maʿrūf wa al-nahy ʿan al-munkar) make it a socio-religious organization that takes the benefits of progress into consideration. This has made the Nahdatul Ulama a non-conventional socio-religious organization. The fact that it does not base itself directly on the Qurʿān and prophetic tradition suggests the recognition of a multifaceted interpretation of Islam's primary sources, which makes it possible to promote dynamic interpretations of these sources in the Indonesian context. Although the NU formally acknowledges the validity of the four recognized schools of Islamic law, it also refers to the views of scholars who do not belong to any specific school.

The Role of the Kyai.

The NU has also had distinct features from the beginning that reflect the subculture of pesantren on which it is based. Central is the charisma of the kyai as a spiritual leader inheriting the authority of the Prophet. This authority derives primarily from the kyai's intellectual and spiritual powers—his command of Arabic, often acquired during a long stay in Mecca, and his profound classical scholarship, usually exemplified by his memorization of the entire Qurʿān and several other texts, his ability to quote from them relevant phras-es or passages in Arabic, and his eloquence in interpreting and explaining them in the vernacular. Buttressing these abilities is his biological and/or spiritual genealogy (isnād, silsilah), often going back to the Prophet himself through a series of renowned ʿulamāʿ or Ṣūfī masters (mursyid; Ar., murshid), from whom he has received the authority to teach (ijāzah). His genealogy also often includes local cultural heroes such as the Javanese nine saints (wali songo) or indigenous rulers. He is not only learned in Islamic disciplines (ilmu; Ar., ʿilm), but is also regarded as endowed with divine power (keramat; Ar., karāmah). Generally, the lifelong loyalty of a santri to his kyai is established in the pesantren, while absolute obedience of a disciple (murid; Ar., murīd) to his master is formed in a pesantren operated by a Ṣūfī order (tarekat; Ar., ṭarīqah).

The kyai's role as spiritual leader is not confined to the compound of the pesantren. He usually serves the local community at large, giving Friday sermons and public lectures and leading ritual prayers on major festivals of the Islamic calendar. If he is a Ṣūfī murshid, he leads prayers (do’a; Ar., duʿāʿ) and recitations (dzikir; Ar., dhikr) on such occasions as Manaqiban—a monthly gathering in praise and commemoration of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, the founder of the Qādirīyah Ṣūfī order—and haul, the anniversary of the death of the founder of the pesantren.

The blessing of God (barakah) possessed by the kyai is overwhelming in the eyes of ordinary Muslims. They join in these gatherings in hundreds and thousands to receive God's blessings through him. Kissing the hand of a kyai to show respect and obtain a share of his barakah is customary in the NU. He also receives a constant stream of visitors requesting advice (nasehat; Ar., naṣīḥah) and legal judgment (fatwā) on such personal matters as seeking marriage partners for their children, resolving family disputes over inheritance, and improving business.

In appreciation of the kyai's guardianship, villagers and parents of santri usually contribute rice and other food, poultry and livestock, fuel and building materials, and cash. Often land and buildings are donated to a pesantren as wakaf (Ar., waqf, charitable donation). Thus most pesantren are financially independent.

The NU has instituted an organizational framework to tap and augment popular religiosity under a kyai's guidance. One of its primary activities is the lailatul ijtimaʿ (Ar., laylat al-ijtimāʿ), a monthly meeting held by the kyai on the eve of the fifteenth day of every lunar month. This begins with ṣalāt al-ghāʿib (ritual prayers for the recently deceased members of the local community), followed by speeches explicating the NU's policies and activities, and a session for questions and answers. The NU thus provides a forum for personal piety and spiritual solidarity through face-to-face communication. These activities centering on the local kyai reflect the grass-root character of the NU, embedded in close-knit interpersonal relationships imbued with the ethics of mutual help among neighbors. Each kyai thus has his own umat (Ar., ummah), or local Muslim community, under his spiritual guardianship.

The kyai is independent of secular rulers, standing on his own religious authority and economic resources. Secular rulers, however, often ask for his consent and support to enhance their legitimacy and control of social order. In this situation, he often assumes the role of mediator or broker between secular rulers and his umat. This relationship gives bargaining power to the kyai vis-à-vis secular rulers. In turn, secular rulers often reward the kyai by giving him position or wealth. This adds to his resources for patronage within the umat. Nonetheless, unless he maintains his charisma in religious terms, political or economic patronage alone is usually insufficient to support his power; moral corruption of ʿulamāʿ by association with secular rulers is one of the most despised situations in Sunnī tradition. The NU is thus ultimately a federation of independent realms of kyais with distinctive characteristics of autonomy, independence from secular rulers, and populism.

Development of the Organization.

From 1930 until the outbreak of World War II, the NU grew rapidly, not only as a movement to counter the advance of reformism, but also as an agent for the internal transformation of the pesantren. Most prominent in this effort was Wahid Hasyim (1900–1957), son of Hasyim Asyʿari, who introduced a modern educational system of madrasahs with graded classes and girls’ education into the pesantren; he also established NU's youth (Ansor) and women's (Muslimat) organizations. He represented the NU in the MIAI (Majlisul Islamil A’laa Indonesia), a federation of Islamic organizations formed in 1937; Hasyim Asyʿari served as its chairman. Through Wahid Hasyim, the NU also joined a political campaign initiated by secular nationalists in 1939, demanding parliamentary representation for Indonesian people. Through these activities the NU organization grew nationally, extending its membership to the Outer Islands.

In the brief but turbulent years of the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), the NU, together with other Muslim organizations, experienced a major change in its relationship with the government—from being the object of hostile colonial control by the Dutch to acting as a tool of mass mobilization for the Japanese. After an initial period banning their activities, the Japanese military authorities not only allowed the NU and the Muḥammadīyah to operate but actually encouraged them to mobilize their members and followers in support of Japanese war efforts. The MIAI was soon transformed into Masyumi (or Masjumi; Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), a comprehensive federation of Islamic organizations that vowed to wage a jihād against the Allies under Japanese leadership. Officially, Hasyim Asyʿari continued to head Masyumi.

Masyumi organized its own paramilitary corps, Hizbullah. Japanese soldiers provided military training. The Japanese military government also restructured the Dutch Bureau of Native Affairs into the Department of Religious Affairs, and appointed first Djajadiningrat, a Dutch-educated scholar, and later Hasyim Asyʿari to head it.

Toward the end of the Japanese occupation, Muslim leaders, including NU representatives, joined secular nationalist leaders in the preparation of a constitution for an independent Indonesia. Muslim leaders argued for an Islamic state under the sharīʿah, but they finally agreed on the formula of the Pancasila (Five Pillars), in which belief in the one and only God was the first element of the philosophical foundations of the nation state. The constitution was promulgated on August 18, 1945, the day after the declaration of Indonesia's independence. Muslim leaders had attained remarkable ascendancy in administration and politics during the Japanese occupation. A war of independence from the Netherlands was fought between 1945 and 1949, when the Dutch finally recognized Indonesia's sovereignty.

Political Activities.

In the war of independence, Islamic forces were united under the Masyumi Party, which had been an umbrella group for all Muslim organizations, including the NU, since November 1945. In 1952, however, the NU withdrew from the Masyumi party to become an independent political party because of disagreement over the status and role of the ʿulamāʿ in the party. The NU wanted to empower the council of ʿulamāʿ, the Syuriyah, as the highest decision-making body of the party; however, the majority of the party leadership, most of them secularly educated, refused to recognize such a special position for the ʿulamāʿ.

In the first parliamentary general elections and the elections for the Constitutional Assembly in 1955, the NU party received 18.4 percent of the total vote, emerging as one of the top four parties alongside the Nationalist Party (PNI), the Masyumi Party, and the Communist Party (PKI). This was an unexpected show of popular support for the NU, which previously had only a handful of individuals prominent in national politics. The election results were also unexpected for other reasons. The Masyumi party, which had formed the core of a series of coalition cabinets, failed to maintain its pre-election dominance in national politics. In addition, the total votes cast for the Islamic parties fell short of a majority, only 43.9 percent, even though the overwhelming majority of Indonesian people professed to be Muslims.

In the Constitutional Assembly, the NU and other Islamic parties endeavored to adopt a new constitution that would make Indonesia an Islamic state. The PNI, PKI, Christian, and other minor parties preferred a secular state based on the Pancasila. The assembly failed to produce a consensus on the constitution. Meanwhile, rebellions in the name of Darul Islam (Islamic State) continued in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi. Moreover, several leaders of the Masyumi party joined the rebels and formed a counter-government in 1958. President Sukarno dissolved the Constitutional Assembly, and banned the Masyumi Party and the PSI (Socialists) for their involvement in the rebellion. He decreed a return to the 1945 constitution and formed the so-called NASAKOM government, a coalition of nationalists, religious forces (including the NU), and Communists.

In all this, the NU recognized Sukarno, in terms of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), as the legitimate head of state to whom Muslim loyalty was due. Since the early period of the Republic, the NU had joined a series of coalition cabinets, thus developing a number of its own politicians, the most prominent being Idham Chalid (b. 1921), who occupied ministerial positions beginning in 1952 when he was first appointed vice-premier. The position of minister of the Department of Religion was occupied by NU leaders from 1949 to 1972, making the department a basis for its political patronage. In the NASAKOM government (1960–1965), the NU's share of power became much greater than before, leading to its deeper entrenchment in the religious bureaucracy.

An unsuccessful Communist-inspired coup attempt in late 1965 transformed the situation. The NU supported the mainstream of the army under Suharto in expelling the Communists and radical nationalists from the national and local political scenes. The NU's parliamentarians were instrumental in banning the PKI and pressing for the president's accountability for the coup attempt. Suharto replaced Sukarno in 1967 and ushered in the so-called New Order (Orde Baru).

The NU party participated in the 1971 general elections as the only one of the four major parties of the 1955 elections to have survived the 1965 turmoil. The NU party, through a vigorous campaign headed by Hasbullah, obtained 10.5 million votes (18.3 percent of the total), thus apparently retaining its 1955 strength; it secured the second position behind Golkar, the newly formed government party, which received an overwhelming 63-percent majority.

Decreasing Political Participation.

The 1971 elections were, however, the last time NU campaigned as an independent political party. From then on, the New Order government denied the NU its share of power, including cabinet seats. Moreover, the government took a drastic measure to secure political stability—the reduction of political parties to only three: Golkar, the Development Unity Party (PPP), and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). At the same time, day-to-day political party activities below the regency (kabupaten) level were forbidden. In 1973, the NU Party was forced to merge with the PPP, and the latter's top leadership was directly controlled by the government. It vigorously promoted the depoliticization of Islam.

After the advent of the New Order, the government implemented programs for rapid economic development with a massive influx of Western capital and technology. This created a number of social problems, including the concentration of wealth among the urban elite and the weakening of indigenous entrepreneurs. The PPP, and its NU faction in parliament in particular, increasingly assumed the role of channeling popular grievances against the negative effects of economic development. Moreover, blatant attempts at the infringement of Muslim rights—for example, the Marriage Law bill of 1973 and the favoring of Javanese indigenous religion over Islam in 1978—aroused widespread resentment in Islamic organizations. Annoyed by this Islamic militancy, the government initiated comprehensive measures to eliminate potential threats to political stability arising from the revival of Islamic political forces. In 1982, it adopted a policy of imposing the Pancasila as the sole foundation of all political and social organizations. After tense negotiations and some bloodshed, it finally won in 1985 by passing new laws to that effect.

The NU's consultative assembly of ʿulamāʿ willingly accepted the new government policy as early as 1983. At the same time, they proposed that the NU sever its relationship with the PPP and return to its original character as a religious, educational, and social organization, with the slogan “Return to the 1926 Principle” (Khittah 1926, from Ar. khiṭṭah). The new direction was to bring the demise of the NU politicians exemplified by Idham Chalid. In 1984, the National Congress of the NU ratified the decisions of the ʿulamāʿ's assembly of the previous year.

The most articulate formulator of the new direction was Ahmad Siddiq (1926–1990), who was elected president of the Syuriyah at the Congress. He argued that the Pancasila was not a religion and could not replace religion. The pillar of belief in the one and only God was in accordance with the Islamic creed of tawḥīd (oneness of God) and represented the Muslim commitment to practice Islam in Indonesia. Therefore, there was nothing in the Pancasila that interfered with Muslim religious faith and Islamic law. The NU should accept the Pancasila as a man-made state philosophy and as a foundation of its organization within the framework of the Republic of Indonesia while retaining Islam as the basis of its members’ religious faith. By stating this, Ahmad Siddiq made it clear that Islam should not confront the state and that the Republic of Indonesia under the Pancasila was the final form with which Indonesian Muslims were to live.

Leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid.

Alongside Ahmad Siddiq's presidency, the 1984 NU Congress elected Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940), son of Wahid Hasyim and grandson of Hasyim Asyʿari, as chairperson of the Tanfidziyah or executive council, while denying Idham Chalid's effort to regain power. They emphasized that at an organizational level, NU was neutral on Indonesia's political stage, but that its members, as individuals, could be active in any political parties of their choice. In spite of complaints from dislocated NU politicians and some ʿulamāʿ, the team of Ahmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid was reelected for another five-year term in the 1989 Congress, indicating the strong support they enjoyed among the majority of the ʿulamāʿ and local activists.

Meanwhile, Abdurrahman Wahid, who is often called Gus Dur, attempted to explain the NU's policies and behavior in theological terms. According to him, the NU was neither opportunistic nor accommodationist, as it was often labeled by outsiders. The tradition of Islamic doctrine to which the NU adhered combined both worldly and other-worldly dimensions of life in one ongoing organic whole, thus forming an effective defense against secularism. The NU's political behavior was to be understood in this perspective. The NU did not recognize the existence of Islamic alternatives outside the status quo. Constant and gradual improvement of a given situation without endangering the existing order was the religiously enjoined guideline for the NU's behavior, including politics. The principle of maintaining the good tradition of previous generations and acquiring a better new practice provided NU with a dynamic approach to dealing with ever-changing contexts. Consensus, including agreeing to disagree, was always sought. This decision-making pattern had great bearing upon national unity and integration because it excluded a confrontational approach in pursuit of political alternatives. Young NU intellectuals and activists follow Abdurrahman Wahid's commitment to empower the nahdliyin (followers of NU) through cultural and religious channels.

After the fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998, the Nahdatul Ulama changed its strategy to become active in practical politics. NU officials at first did not enthusiastically respond to the demands of the nahdliyin out of concern that it might violate the consensus of the organization to return to the 1926 Khittah. However, a Committee of Five prepared for the establishment of a political party called Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the National Awakening Party) to channel their political aspirations. NU kyais declared the establishment of the PKB in 1998. Although the party is not formally affiliated with NU and is open to any element of the nation, it has the nahdliyin as its base. With the mandate of Indonesia's People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Abdurrahman Wahid, who was the president of both NU and PKB, became Indonesia's fourth president (October 1999 to July 2001) with the support of Amin Rais, former president of Muḥammadīyah, and its middle caucus.

After Abdurrahman Wahid became Indonesia's president, Muhammad Ahmad Sahal Mahfudh was chosen as president of the NU Syuriyah and Achmad Hasyim Muzadi as the chairperson of the Tanfidziyah. Under their leadership, the distinction between NU as a socio-religious organization and the participation of individual members in the political arena was not clearly maintained. In the 2004 national presidential election, Muzadi ran for vice-president. His unsuccessful race drew both strong criticism against the use of the NU as a vehicle for political gain and demands for its elected leaders to disengage from practical politics.

The NU is faced with enormous social challenges as the twenty-first century unfolds. Industrialization and urbanization are reducing the rural population and changing rural ways of life at a rapid rate, and the expansion of modern national education is affecting the continuity of traditional Islamic scholarship based on pesantren education. The shape of Islam in the future of Indonesia, as well as that of Indonesia itself, in turn seems to depend much on the direction and behavior of the NU in responding to these challenges. A new generation of NU leadership, personified by Abdurrahman Wahid, is endeavoring to respond to them by transforming the NU into a massive social movement for a more democratic, prosperous, and religiously harmonious Indonesia. But the dilemma it faces in doing so is acute. On the one hand, it has to maintain “tradition”; on the other, it has to adjust to urbanization, modernization, and other current trends. Religious literalism, radicalism, and violence are among the issues with which NU is struggling. More importantly, it has yet to settle on its role in practical politics.

See also ABDURRAHMAN WAHID; INDONESIA; MASJUMI; PARTAI PERSATUAN PEMBANGUNAN; PESANTREN; and SAREKAT ISLAM.

Bibliography

  • Abdurrahman Wahid. “The Nahdlatul Ulama and Islam in Present Day Indonesia.” In Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, edited by Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique, pp. 175–85. Singapore, 1986. A systematic explanation of NU's orientation and behavior in terms of its religious foundations by its current top leader.
  • Anwar, Ali. “Avonturisme” NU: Menjejaki Akar Konflik Kepentingan Politik Kaum Nahdhiyyin. Bandung, Indonesia, 2004. An examination of whether NU's bargaining power has diminished in the Indonesian political system.
  • Baso, Ahmad. NU Studies: Pergolakan Pemikiran antara Fundamentalisme Islam dan Fundamentalisme Neo-Liberal. Jakarta, 2006. Exploration of how the NU tradition perceives Sunnī principles interacting with nationalism and post-colonial phenomena.
  • Benda, Harry. The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942–1945. Leiden, Netherlands, 1983. A classical study describing the ascendancy of the Islamic movement, including the NU, in Indonesian politics and administration through the Japanese occupation.
  • Bruinessen, Martin van. “Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script used in the Pesantren Milieu.”Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde146, nos. 2–3 (1990): 226–269. A report of an extensive survey on the so-called “Yellow Books,” that is, textbooks in Arabic script, used in Indonesia's pesantren.
  • Bruinessen, Martin van. NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, dan Pencarian Wahana Baru. Exploration of the genealogy of power and the transformation of the Nahdatul Ulama.
  • Bruinessen, Martin van. “The 28th Congress of the Nahdlatul Ulama: Power Struggle and Social Concerns.”Archipel41 (1991): 185–199. An informative field report on the 1989 NU National Congress.
  • Dharwis, Ellyasa K. H., ed.Gus Dur, NU, dan Masyarakat Sipil. Jakarta, 1994. Discussion of the roles of Abdurrahman Wahid and the NU in the promotion of Indonesia's civil society.
  • Fealy, Greg, and Greg Barton, eds.Nahdlatul Ulama: Tradi- tional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia. Clayton, Australia, 1996. Collection of articles detailing the ways in which NU leaders have used conservative theological concepts to foster religious pluralism and to create a vision of a modern and democratic Indonesia in a global context.
  • Geertz, Clifford. “The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Roles of a Cultural Broker.”Comparative Studies in Society and History2 (1960): 228–249. Places Javanese ʿulamāʿ as mediators between the Jakarta-centered state power and local communities.
  • Haidar, M. Ali. Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia: Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik. Jakarta, 1994. Exploration of the religious idioms and the application of religious legal reasoning in Indonesian politics.
  • Jones, Sidney. “The Contraction and Expansion of the Umat and the Role of the Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia.”Indonesia38 (1984): 1–20. Reports on the encroachment of the NU constituency by the New Order government.
  • Karim, A. Gaffar. Metamorfosis: NU dan Politisasi Islam Indonesia. Jakarta, 1995. Discussion on the historical transformation of the NU and its prospects on Indonesia's political stage.
  • Nakamura, Mitsuo. “The Radical Traditionalism of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang.”Tonan Ajia Kenkyu [Southeast Asian Studies]19 no. 2 (1981): 187–204. An attempt at understanding organizational features of the NU, in which ʿulamāʿ play a decisive role, and their political implications.
  • Sjadzili, A. Fawaid, ed.Memberdayakan Warga NU: 20 Tahun Perjalanan Lakpesdam. Jakarta, 2005. An account of the efforts of NU's young cadres to empower nahdliyin through its socio-religious works.
  • Zahro, Ahmad. Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il, 1926–1999. Jakarta, 2004. Discussion of the methods, references, and validity of NU's legal reasoning between 1926 and 1999.
  • Zamakhsyari, Dhofier. “Kinship and Marriage among the Javanese Kyai.”Indonesia29 (1980): 47–58. A detailed description of kinship and marriage networks among leading ʿulamāʿ families in Java since the late nineteenth century.
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